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Atkins v. Commonwealth
581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003)
I. Fads
Daryl Renard Atkins ("Atkins") was convicted of the capital murder of Eric
Michael Nesbitt ("Nesbitt").' After finding the statutory aggravating factors of
future dangerousness and vileness, the jury recommended, and the court im-
posed, a sentence of death.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Atkins's conviction in A tkirs v mmzmasd ("A tkim I").3 However, the court
found error in the penaltyphase and remanded the case to the circuit court for
a new penaltyproceeding on the capital murder conviction.4 At the resentencing
hearing, a new jury fixed Atkins's punishment at death and, in accordance with
the juryverdict, the circuit court imposed a death sentence.' Atkins appealed this
sentence on several grounds, including that the court should have, as a part of
proportionality review, commuted his sentence of death to life imprisonment
because he is mentally retarded.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
view and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in Atki* u Cnxnuzltb
(Atkm I1"). The Supreme Court of Virginia was unable to conclude that
Atkins's death sentence was " 'excessive or disproportionate to sentences gener-
ally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to Atkins'
murder of Nesbitt.'"'8 Nor was the court "willing to commute Atkins' sentence
of death to life imprisonment" without parole based solely on his IQ score.'
1. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,453 (Va. 1999) [hereinafterA tkim 1]. Atkins,
armed with a semiautomatic handgun, abducted Nesbitt from a parking lot, drove him to an ATM,
forced him to withdraw $200, and then drove him to an isolated area where he shot Nesbitt eight
times, killing him. Id at 449-50.
2. Id at 453. See &ra/Uy VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (Mfichie 2000) (stating that a
defendant may only receive a death sentence if a jury finds an aggravating factor and recommends
that a death sentence be imposed).
3. A tku 1, 510 S.E2d at 457.
4. Id,(remanding because "the trial court's instructions and the form the jurywas given to
use in discharging its obligations were in conflict").
5. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E2d 312,314 (Va. 2000) [hereinafter A tirz Il].
6. Id at 318.
7. Id at 321; se Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude the execution of the mentally retarded by virtue of mental retarda-
tion alone).
8. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514, 515 (Va. 2003) [hereinafter Adk IV]
(quoting Atk II, 534 S.E2d at 321).
9. Id (citing Aeim 1, 534 S.E.2d at 321). In addition to a low IQ score, two forensic
psychologists agreed that mental retardation is, in part, also a function of a person's capacity for
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Atkins successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari."0 The United States Supreme Court held in Atkim v Virginia"
("Atkim IIr') that, "the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the
State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender." 2 The Court
concluded that "a national legislative consensus against the execution of mentally
retarded offenders had developed since its decision in Pemy v Lyu4.
Further, the Court articulated "two reasons consistent with the legislative consen-
sus" that justified the exclusion of the mentally retarded from death eligibility.4
First, the Court determined that retribution and deterrence, two of the justifica-
tions recognized as bases for the death penalty, do not applyto mentallyretarded
offenders." Second, the Court determined that the reduced capacity of mentally
retarded offenders made these offenders more vulnerable to wrongful
execution. 6 The Court stated that these offenders are more vulnerable because
theyare less capable of making a persuasive showing of mitigating evidence; they
are less capable of aiding their counsel; they are generally poor witnesses; and
utilizing their mental illnesses as a mitigating factor can have an adverse affect on
juries- causing them to predict that the mentally retarded offenders will be a
future danger.' The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and remanded the case for "further proceedings not
inconsistent with" its opinion."s
adaptive behavior. A tkim I, 534 S.E.2d at 320-21. Both testified that Atkins was able to appreci-
ate the criminality of his conduct and conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Id at
321.
10. Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976, 976 (2001) (mere.) (granting writ of certiorar).
11. 536 US. 304 (2002).
12. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304, 321 (2002) [hereinafter A tkinz 111] (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)). SeegevayKristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.
J. 117 (2002) (analying Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. 0. 2242 (2002)).
13. Atkzim IV, 581 S.E.2d at 515 (ciing A tkilI, 536 US. at 316).
14. Atkin I1, 536 U.S. at 318.
15. Id at 319.
16. Id at 320-2 1. In explaining how the justifications relied on for the imposition of the
death penaltydo not applyto the mentally retarded, the Court stated that "i]f the culpabilityof the
average murderer is insufficient to justifythe most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser
culpabilityof the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution-" Id at
319. itionally if the goal of deterrence is to give an increased sentence to inhibit criminals from
murderous conduct, and mentally retarded defendants suffer from cognitive and behavior impair-
ments, it does not make sense that they could process the possibility of a death sentence and, as a
result, use that information to control their behavior. Id at 319-20.
17. Id at 320-21.
18. Id at 321.
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1I. Hdding
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the United States
Supreme Court had not determined whether Atkins was mentally retarded, nor
had that determination been made at any point during the prior proceedings. 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia remanded the case "to the circuit court where the
sentence of death was imposed bya jury."20 The court ordered that" 'the circuit
court shall empanel a new jury for the sole purpose of making a determination
of mental retardation.' "21
IlL A no~sis
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that in A deim II, the United States
Supreme Court did not hold that Atkins was mentally retarded.22 Recalling its
opinion inA tkin II, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the resentencing
juryheard conflicting testimony from two forensic clinical psychologists regard-
ing Atkins's mental retardation.23 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that in A tkins II it held that" it]he question of Atkins' mental retardation
is a factual one, and as such, it is the function of the factfinder, not this Court,
to determine the weight that should be accorded to expert testimony on thatissue.'"24 The Supreme Court of Virginia further noted that the United States
Supreme Court did not reverse that portion of its holding.
Acknowledging that the Commonwealth disputed the allegation that Atkins
was mentally retarded, the United States Supreme Court inAtkim III stated that
"'[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall
within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national
consensus."' 26 The Supreme Court did not articulate what that range of mental
retardation is, nor did it define the term "mental retardation." 27 Instead, the
Court left to the states the task of developing a means of enforcing the constitu-
tional restriction on the execution of the mentally retarded. 8
19. Atkim IV, 581 S.E.2d at 515.
20. Id at 517.
21. Id (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2003)).
22. Id at 515.
23. /d (citingAtkvf, 534 SE.2d at 320). The Government's forensic psychologissaply
disagred] with the defense psychologist's conclusion that Atkins was dly mentally retarded.
A tkimf I, 534 S.E.2d at 319.
24. A tkir IV, 581 S.E2d. at 515 (quotingAtkir I, 534 S.E.2d at 320).
25. Id
26. Id (quoting A tkuv II, 536 US. at 317).
27. Id at 516 (citing A tkin I1, 536 U.S. at 317).
28. Id (citing Atkim II, 536 U.S. at 317).
2003]
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The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the critical question with respect
to the constitutionality of Atkins's death sentence is whether he suffers from
mental retardation.29 Because the resentencing jury did not resolve the question
of Atkins's mental retardation definitively, the Supreme Court of Virginia pointed
to the fact that the jury was instructed to consider mitigating evidence." The
jury, although presented with Atkins's IQ score, determined that this evidence
"'did not mitigate his culpability for the murder of Nesbitt.' 31 The court stated
that because the factual question of Atkins's mental retardation had never been
resolved, it must be considered in light of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on execution of the mentally retarded. 2
Although Atkins acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not make a
specific factual finding that he was mentally retarded, he argued that the Court
did implicitlycome to this conclusion." Atkins argued that if the Supreme Court
had not made such a finding, he would not have had standing to raise his Eighth
Amendment claim and the Supreme Court's decision would have been purely
advisory.34 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this view and stated that
Atkins had standing to raise a constitutional issue because of the allegations,
evidence, and arguments presented to the circuit court and to the Supreme Court
of Virginia regarding his mental retardation. The court found that Atkins
"demonstrated a 'personal stake in the outcome[,]' thereby 'assu.,ing] that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues necessaryfor the
proper resolution of the constitutional question' 
36
The United States Supreme Court in A tkim III noted that the remand in
Atkins's case shared procedural characteristics with the remand in Fordv Wain-
ni'itY In Fonta "the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
a State from executing an insane prisoner."" Although the Supreme Court found
the State's procedures for determining insanityinadequate, the Court left to " 'the
State[s] [sic] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon its execution of sentences.'" 9 The Fold Court "remanded the
proceeding to a federal district court for a de now evidentiary hearing on the
29. Id
30. A 1tki IV, 581 SE.2d at 516 (citing A tkim I1, 534 S.E.2d at 320).





36. A&in IV, 581 S.E.2d at 516 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US. 95, 101
(1983)) (alteration in original).
37. Id (citing Fon4 477 US. at 410).
38. Id (citing Fon, 477 US. at 410).
39. Id (quoting Font 477 U.S. at 416-17).
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question of the prisoner's competence to be executed."" The United States
Supreme Court similarly left to the states the implementation of the A tkim
mandate.
4 '
In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision inA tkim III, the
Virginia General Assembly enacted emergency legislation that is currently in
effect.42 This legislation defines the term "mentally retarded."" Additionally,
under this legislation, the defendant bears "the burden of proving mental retarda-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence.""
Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 requires the Supreme Court of Virginia to
consider a claim of mental retardation by a person who was sentenced to death
before the enactment of the emergencylegislation and to determine whether his
claim is frivolous.45 Upon reviewing the evidence of mental retardation pre-
sented at Atkins's resentencing hearing, the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined that Atkins's claim was not frivolous.' Because Atkins's claim was first
made on direct appeal from the resentencing hearing, the Supreme Court of
Virginia remanded to the circuit court the question of whether Atkins is mentally
retarded and instructed the circuit court to follow the requirements set forth in
the General Assembly's emergency legislation.4
IV. Ap&pim inv v
Virginia's new statutoryprocedures are not sufficient to protect a mentally
retarded offender from being sentenced to death. Under the Virginia procedures,
40. Id (citing Fon4 477 US. at 418).
41. Id at 515.
42. Atim IV, 581 S.E.2d. at 517; seeaso VA. CODE ANN. SS 8.01-654.2,18.2-10, 19.2.-175,
19.2-2643:1, 19.2-2643:1.1, 19.2-264.3:1.2, 19.2-264.3:3, and 19.2-264.4 (Mcie Supp. 2003)
(setting forth the statutory procedures-for determining mental retardation in capital cases).
43. Arim IV, 581 S.E.2d at 517 (citing VA. CODE ANN. S192-264.3:1.1(A)). The Virginia
legislature defined mental retardation as follows:
.enallyretarded" means a disability, on iating before the e of 18 year, c t-
ized concurrenty by (i) significantly subverage intellectual uncion as demon-
strated byperformance on a standardized measure of intellectual funioning admini -
tered in conformity with accepted professional practice, that is at least two standard
ations below e mean " sigi..cant limitations in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social practical adaptive skills.
Id at 517 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.1(A)).
44. Id at 517; sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2.-2643:1.1(C) (stating that "the defendant shall bear
the burden of proving that he is mentally retarded bya preponderance of the evidence-).
45. Atkin IV, 581 S.E2d at 517; see VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654.2 (stating the procedures
for presentation of a claim of mental retardation bya person sentenced to death before April 29,
2003).




the defendant bears the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence."8 Because mental retardation, if proven, can prohibit the
state from imposing death on a capital defendant, the burden should fall on the
government to prove the absence of retardation before a defendant becomes
death eligible. Lack of mental retardation should, therefore, to be treated as an
element under Rig v A nzcma. 9 In Tzscn' AnZCimi andEmrdv Florida' the
Supreme Court articulated the minimum Eighth Amendment mens rea and actus
reus that the defendant must have shown during the commission of the charged
crime in order to be sentenced to death. 2 In the federal death penalty system,
the Ennrid and Tson factors act as a gateway through which the government
must pass in order to reach jury consideration on the issue of death. 3 The
Supreme Court's holding in A tkim, using the logic of Enrid and Ttso', should
have created Virginia's first gateway factor.5" In Virginia, mental retardation
should be treated just as the Ennidi and Ttson factors are treated in the federal
system. The government should have the burden of proving non-mental retarda-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt before the jurymayconsider the death penalty."5
We invite practitioners to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse with
issues related to mental retardation in capital cases.6
Meghan H Morgan
48. SeeVA. CoDEANN. § 192-264.3:1.1(C (placingthe burdenofprovingmentalretardaion
on the defendant).
49. SwRing v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002) (holding that because enumerated aggravat-
ing factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jur-/.
50. 481 US. 137 (1987).
51. 458 US. 782 (1982).
52. See Tson v. Arizona, 481 US. 137, 156-58 (1987) (holding that if an individualized
inquiry into a defendant's mental state reveals major participation in a felony and reckless indiffer-
ence to human life, the Ewnd culpabilty requirement is sufficient to warrant the imposition of
the death sentence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a sentence of death
is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an accomplice to murder).
53. See 18 US.C 5 3591(a) (2000) (requiring a defendant to have acted intentionally in the
commission of the requisite crime to be eligible for death); 21 US.C 5 848(n) (2000) (listing the
federal aggravating factors that must be alleged to seek a death sentence).
54. See VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31 (lfhie Supp. 2003) (subsuming the Tcn issue because
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" is an element of capital murder in Virginia); VA CODE
ANN. S 18.2-18 (fichie Supp. 2003) (subsuming the Enmetiactus reus requirement bysetting forth
the limited circumstances under which a principal in the second degree or an accessory before the
fact may be charged with capital 
murder).
55. For a more thorough analysis of the logic applied herein see Kristen F. Grunewald, Case
Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 117, 123-24 (2002) (analyzing Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. C. 2242 (2002)).
56. Contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
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